

4-25-12 DE on Hellman on Cuba.docx

On Hellman on Cuba:

Burlatsky: K wanted to present JFK with a fait accompli.

(See my theory of crises: faits malaccomplis.

He'll (have to) eat it; as we did in Turkey.

Nitze, Rusk: We'll have to eat it.

Prof. Barton Bernstein, one of the world's leading experts on the Cuban Missile Crisis, wrote:

[Referring to plans to place American missiles in Italy, Turkey, and possibly Greece:] in summer 1959 ... President Eisenhower privately expressed his worries about placing these IRBMs so near the Soviet Union. "If Mexico or Cuba had been penetrated by the Communists," he said in the paraphrased words of the minutes, "and then began getting arms and missiles from [the Soviets], we would be bound to look on such developments with the gravest concern and in fact... it would be imperative for us [even] to take ... offensive military action." Such thinking, however, did not block his administration's movement toward an agreement with Turkey to take some Jupiters.¹⁷

Bernstein cites another instance of this ability to see the danger of our Turkish deployment. An

April 1961 letter written by Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles to President Kennedy

warned: "I am particularly concerned that we may fail to understand the Soviet reaction to our

own defense programs. A double standard which allows us to react angrily at the slightest rumor

of a Soviet missile base in Cuba, while we introduce ... missile set ups in Turkey... is dangerously self-defeating." ¹⁸

Prof. Hellman, "Nuclear Weapons, Risk and Hope," Handout #6, STS152, AUT 2011-12, Page 13 of 16

¹⁷ Barton J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problem of the American

Jupiters in Turkey," in James A. Nathan (Editor), *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited*, St. Martin's Press,

New York, 1992, page 58. While Castro's revolution had taken control of Cuba the preceding winter,

Castro was not yet a Communist. As noted in earlier references to Burlatsky's book on Khrushchev, "At

that time Castro was neither a Communist nor a Marxist. It was the Americans themselves who pushed

him in the direction of the Soviet Union."

¹⁸ Barton J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problem of the American

Jupiters in Turkey," in James A. Nathan (Editor), *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited*, St. Martin's

Press,
New York, 1992 page 55.
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Deception (though attempt to make a record, at least, that they didn't lie: defensive weapons. But apparently some lies, verbally, through Bolshakov.) Gromyko relieved that he wasn't confronted directly, merely "offensive weapons." (Southard, too, started by thinking they hadn't lied).

JFK makes a commitment, precisely because he had been deceived into thinking it very improbable (See Sorensen; and ...? Cline? Dobbs, p. 16: "I should have said we didn't care." McN to Yarmo: shouldn't have made commitment.

JFK having given a threat and made a commitment, K tries (to deter? Too late!) with his own commitment: [On September 12, 1962 Moscow warned that] "one cannot now attack Cuba and expect the aggressor will be free from punishment. If this attack is made, this will be the beginning of the unleashing of war."¹⁶ [Khrushchev thus faced a similar dilemma to Kennedy if America did not heed his warning.] ¹⁶ Richard K. Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1987, page 112.

McCone gets it right: partly because he knows covert ops (did his DDI analysts?!) If he hadn't expressed his view, JFK wouldn't have made a public commitment; and if he had stayed home and pressed the case, JFK wouldn't have made a public commitment! JFK thought he was suppressing a small possibility that SU might do it...

JFK (and McG B) had stuck his neck out, contradicting Keating (and making commitment) (See Keating source: Holland on Luce) (Time?!)

JFK had trusted Bolshakov; thought he had a secret partner in K; felt betrayed, fooled, made a public fool of, and threatened right before an election (in which Repubs were making an issue of Cuba, urging invasion;

Which JFK was secretly preparing; and preparing to provoke; (rat's nest, snake pit)

All partly because of Cuba I (going back into Ike administration and 1960 campaign—which N had really won!—(close election: see Jackie to me, on VN—but it also applied to Cuba): same situation, reversed (just two years earlier): JFK pressing for action, N disclaiming, it would be aggression (but see My Six Crises: I knew American people didn't care about law, they wanted results): so JFK couldn't back off from plans entirely! (JCS and CIA counted on the situation forcing JFK to reverse himself on American involvement: which was really crucial, just as it would be in MongOOSE; and it would be in VN; and they counted on it in 1967-68...LBJ

wanted then to produce a F.A. to Congress—but I threatened premature disclosure, making a FA impossible; 206,000 leak made it a F.MA.

See JFK and RFK rage at humiliation of defeat in Cuba I (though NYT had not leaked; it was a F.MA wrt to Cuba, inevitably, but was meant to be a FA for American public; however, it was a failure, not merely a surprise. And that was inevitable, as in VN: there wasn't a way to get a real success in Cuba! (unless assassination plans had worked? And Guantanamo provocation, like Northwoods, planned for C-I as well as C-II! But our invasion plans were laughable, in spring 61: as I found. No CI plans!)

So, Mongoose (EGL! Secrecy from me!)

Like FS plans for Berlin, 61: secret from me. (I'm in VN! Having recommended increase in USMC, "infantry soldier" as JFK's weapon in campaign, rather than missile gap.)

K feared (?) US intervention against movement, blockade of missiles going in: NOT attack on missiles once they were there (reading JFK and MCN correctly on this). But not allowing for (a) US spotting missiles before they were operational on the ground, with warheads; (b) JFK willing to make crisis (if K didn't announce it) before the election; (c) JFK inability to keep THIS secret for several weeks (they did for a week—though leaks before Oct. 22 to Keating!—once missiles were found, because JCS were led to believe by JFK that he would remove them; if he had spoken otherwise, they would have leaked; they didn't want to enrage him, if he were on the right track, and cause him to reverse course by leaking; their incentives would seem to have been mixed (especially once he went for blockade: but they still expected an attack), but if he had sounded like Stevenson from the start (as he really felt, after about an hour, though he wanted to make an appearance of doing something) they would not only have leaked but have allied with republicans to force him to attack and invade).

So his rage at being fooled, politically endangered, betrayed (by an "ally" and friend: Bolshakov and K) and the commitment that the earlier deception had tricked him into (inadvertently: not desired: if K had warned him against this, he would be running a risk of a blockade) (a commitment that JFK had assumed would not be "called," invoked)

Contradiction: the early moves—building up Cuba, SAMs especially—put pressure on JFK to react, from Repubs; yet K did not use SAMs to stop U-2's! and didn't delay deploying missiles until SAMS were operational and being used (as McCone expected: which made him willing to go off on honeymoon). Why not? Fear of invasion before election? A shootdown of U-2 would contradict his assurance to JFK that he would not cause embarrassment or crisis before election?

(Plausible: new thought for me. How could he really believe U-2 would not see missiles? Screw-up, as Russians say? Or, belief that JFK would not disclose before elections? Cline thinks that JFK did mean to conceal SAMs—and II-28s?—till after

election? (The latter?) PSALM and earlier constraints. (What was code-name for Mongoose? Who was witting? Bigot list.)

There was lots to hide, before and after crisis. (See McG feelings about my study, of C-II). As there was before and after JFK assassination. And escalation in VN. (Nixon's policy is still not understood, at all! Or its relation to WG, through me.)

So, F.M.A.: period when missiles are discovered by US, but not operational. (And this period is prolonged, by K allowing uncertainty as to whether nuc warheads had arrived! And the fact that tac nuc missiles and warheads had arrived. And delegation (as a possibility: an actuality before Oct. 22).

"Why civilization ended" Post-mortem—on a species, on global civilization, on vertebrates (not just primates, mammals: maybe most insects would survive nuc winter—as they did the CT catastrophe—and nuclear radiation) (what invertebrates would survive, mainly in oceans, despite loss of sunlight and cooling?)

K played out RFK's deadline to the limit ("a day to decide, two days to start removing") and tried but failed to get Castro to stop shooting at low-level planes; he hits one or two, JFK attacks SAMs and missiles:

--and invades, leading to tac nucs on US troops

--OR Guantanamo is destroyed by cruise missile (out of communications), under air attack (like SAM being fired)

--OR SU sub fires its torpedo, on Saturday (?)

--OR US air defense planes fire nuc at SU planes chasing U-2 on Saturday

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How would any of these ever be known? Well, Washington might well have survived, along with nearly all US cities, if one—or several!—of these had occurred leading to a US first strike!

It would take a year or two for nuclear winter/fall to kill off everyone by starvation! Lots of time to study what happened! There wouldn't be much chance to study anything on the SU side, unless the Sov Embassy had gotten well informed during the crisis: and unless a knowledgeable Sov, knowing Khrushchev's preparations, etc. had been in DC during the crisis. Gromyko? Bolshakov? Feklisov?

Our deployment to Turkey under JFK had not been a deliberate provocation (though its possible risks had been considered, both by Ike and by JFK; somehow (?) he had **never** ordered it stopped, when informed of resistance by Turks (for whom, Polaris was **no** substitute. Polaris wasn't a tripwire! For that, vulnerability was needed! See quote by SAC Commander, on desirability of vulnerability of MM!

US was **cocked** to the hilt (so to speak): invasion force, and blockade force, ready to go—because of Mongoose schedule (aimed at election?); and because of Republican pressure responding to SU buildup, and possible need to invade before election.

What K didn't foresee was the speed and aggressiveness of the US response (F.MA pattern) (Suez, Skybolt) (any other nuc crises, really? Not Quemoy crises; go through list... Saddam attack on Kuwait? Still: general risks of: deception; creating unpleasant surprise; humiliation;

More frequent pattern: Strangelove Perplex.

K's **failure to announce the presence of tac nucs and warheads**—along with his decision to deploy them, which could have blocked an invasion--made WWII more likely: because it made an invasion more likely (rather than impossible!), while assuring that it would turn into WWII!

RT, 10-14-11

Ronald Reagan's flirtation with Strategic Defense Initiative (better known as *Star Wars*) prompted Soviet leader Yuri Andropov to comment: *"It is time they [Washington] stopped... searching for the best ways of unleashing nuclear war... Engaging in this is not just irresponsible. It is insane."*

In 2007, then-President Vladimir Putin evoked one of the most dangerous showdowns of the Cold War to underscore Russian opposition to US missile defense system in Europe, comparing the threat to the Cuban missile crisis. *"Analogous actions by the Soviet Union, when it deployed missiles in Cuba, prompted the 'Caribbean crisis,'"* Putin said, using the Russian term for the Cuban Missile Crisis. *"For Russia the situation is technologically very similar. We have withdrawn the remains of our bases from Vietnam, from Cuba, and have liquidated everything there, while at our borders, such threats against our country are being created."*

Hellman, Oct. 15, 11

We neglect early warning signs such as at this *RT* article at our peril. The *Concorde* supersonic airliner suffered 57 tire-related incidents before the 58th caused a crash, killing all aboard. *Air & Space magazine* reports that, "Of those [57], 32 blowouts damaged the aircraft's structure, engines, or hydraulics, and six resulted in penetration of one or more

fuel tanks.” Neglecting the *Concorde*’s early warning signs cost 109 lives. Let’s stop neglecting nuclear weapons’ early warning signs, where the cost would be astronomically larger.

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Hellman on risk of all-out war

--Both experts and public almost ignore the very possibility of all-out nuclear war (while regarding terrorist attack over the next decade to be between 1% (Albright) and 50% (Lugar), median of experts perhaps 20%. But no studies or discussion of the risk of all-out war: or consideration of how to reduce it. (Hellman's focus)

--What month in 1961 did IRBMs start to go in, in Turkey? Was it after September? After Gilpatric, October? Then, no excuse at all. (Or really, after March: McNamara). Nothing but increase in our vast superiority in FS capability.

Nothing needed on Type I deterrence (which they lowered: and would have done so even if there were parity).

Mongoose, with its requirement for invasion; assassination attempts; de Soto; JFK and McN FS threats! (Athens!) (Ann Arbor) ; Invasion exercises (Ortsac); invasion (plans and) preparations; SU (correct) belief (and Castro's) that JFK meant to overthrow and invade; USG buildup despite superiority (known: Gilpatric): Polaris, MM;

1985 article:

[What modes of thinking must we change, to cease to drift toward unparalleled catastrophe? (He wrote this in 1985, Dad read it then, died one week after our discussion of it. Gorbachev came to power that year; adopted GRIT and mutual security, non-offensive defense, removed tanks from East Germany; IRBM treaty (see Turkey, Cuba-II, 1962; P-II 1983); end of CW in 1989. (Gulf War, 1991: nuc threats!) (Yeltsin false alarm, 1993; Able Archer and Andropov, 1983;

Failure to change thinking in 40 years since Einstein's prophecy (1946); or in 27 years since this article...lost years... Nor in 1989, end of CW.

Like me, Hellman opposes view: Nuc war is so horrible, no one would let it happen.

"If we persist in our old mode of thinking, WWIII is not just possible, it is inevitable...The proof that WWII is inevitable on our current path has a corollary: The only way to avoid extinction is to build a world in which war is totally unthinkable."

[No. That's to say, "Anything with a probability of happening in a given year greater than zero is inevitable, certain to occur (eventually)." But what if it is made "impossible" at some point? (Actually, nuclear winter could be made impossible, without an enormous change in our mode of thinking! Change, yes. But war could still be occurring, even at present rate. VERY hard to make it "unthinkable" for humans.

MH: technology could give us a World in which hunger, overpopulation, ignorance, and the other root causes of war are eliminated." [Other? Efforts by elites and institutions, empires, to maintain their status or expand their power?]

MH: WWIII would not be "survived" like WWI and WWII or any past wars...

He uses 3MT for ALL weapons used in WWII (Willens). Current firepower (1985): 18,000 MT: 6000 WWII's.

(Able Archer scare was in 1983, under Reagan and Andropov; same years as TTAPS on nuclear winter! (Year after Freeze rally in Central Park) (Year after I was in Leningrad with Sirius!—proposed Freeze and NFU to Primakov)

EMP; ozone; nuc winter.

Describe the scenario of the world starving to death. (Does nuc winter actually depend on firestorms being all in a short period of time? Since smoke lasts much longer in stratosphere, ten years...) (How much blackout is needed to stop photosynthesis? Effect in oceans?)

End of civilization. (Meaning? Spell out).

It means, not just "the end of humanity, the end of 'life,'" but

The destruction of "us," "we" in all its senses, with respect to a given person or group. All our "we's."

MH: Twice the world has been in the state of Global War, and returned to "Armed Defense" (including limited wars and preparations for global war). (And that may have been possible in the early years of the nuclear era: US monopoly, US superiority with A-bombs, say 1945-55. But from 1956 or so, certainly by 1958-60, Global War (even by a US FS) had become "an absorbing state, a one-way street, a path of no return..." No recovery (contrary to Herman Kahn, ignoring nuc winter!)

Compare Kahn's OTW!

Never "Unthinkable."

(Isn't MH's list of threats, from me, 1981? Or rather than threatened: Executive branch considered at high level, presidents "presented with imminent nuclear options" by JCS or civs, participated in discussions (sometimes asked for them: Nixon)

"No matter how small the probability of transition into the state of GLOBAL WAR is, so long as it stays bigger than zero, ending up in the GLOBAL WAR state is *inevitable*. [His emphasis]...On our current path WWIII is not just a possibility. It is a mathematical certainty." [NO]

[What if **you are uncertain** whether nuc war may occur—but it is "really impossible." (Heads is impossible: because the coin has two tails; but you don't know that, for certain.) (Uncertainty does not equal "a statistical frequency greater

than zero." It might "be" impossible; or you might stop playing, or make it impossible; or someone or something else makes it impossible. You don't change your mode of thinking, uncertainty or behavior; but...]

He seems to be thinking entirely in terms of "statistical frequencies," "objective" probabilities (though he allows for "uncertainty," hard to calculate: wants "order of magnitude" estimates of probability...)

[By his reason, it is inevitable—"with probability one"—that you will win a lottery, no matter how many tickets there are, "if you play continually." [How much should you pay? See St. Petersburg Paradox!

How much should you pay—how urgently should you work—to avoid nuclear holocaust, "with probability one"?

[Hyp: We must move to a world in which the probability of nuclear winter, or extinction...is zero (NO cost to this, in terms of foreign policy: or is there? What are the obstacles? Obviously, some institutions think that to depart from current posture is risky or costly for them, or for the system...]

We must move to a world in which the chance of killing...one billion people...is much, much, much lower than at present: AND we must do that without making preparations that increase the chance of losing a billion or more than a billion in **some** circumstances (contrary to our "deterrence" policies of the past), or hold the possibility of greater destruction than now possible, in some circumstances (ditto).

[Now, some leaders accept a much higher chance of nuclear war (than Hellman supposes) for a limited period, a crisis—with expectation and hope of avoiding significant losses, or making particular gains. Their "values" (vN-M utilities, or...) are "crazy," out of line with what "outsiders" would think sane or moral. But they are not "certain" to lose, nor are we certain that the world will lose if we let them do this every twenty years or so, for another century. The risks are, however, larger than they think, or we think; fairly large; much larger than should be allowed (a desperate situation, indeed: without certainty or near-certainty).

After all: the chance of abolishing war is above zero, each year: so, "certain," "inevitable"?

(It was not this reasoning that impressed Dad in 1975; but the nuclear winter, the stakes; and the moral consequences of making the threats and preparations, legitimizing it, threatening it, consequences on us, and the dangers these posed.

The risk we are consciously accepting...magnifies the (objective) risk, makes it larger; and makes us worse people, more dangerous, more depraved (the more, once we are made aware of this, we let it persist, ignore it, act as bystanders; or revert to denial; or worse, participate, vote for threateners, accept taxes for it, allow

Congress to ignore it or vote for it or fail to investigate or shift funding... (see, torture! Detention! Aggressive war! Surveillance state!)

MH: "We must shift from an old mode of thinking, **which justifies war as necessary for survival**, [or to suffering a "state worse than war, worse than...extinction] to a **new mode of thinking, which recognizes war as the ultimate threat to survival.**" [and war spending as the ultimate threat to any dealing with our large problems]

(Nuc war? All-out nuc war? Large war? What of: rev war; liberation war; (metaphor: "war on poverty, cancer, disease, dope, evil": meaning mobilization, unity, focus of effort, sacrifice.... Can't we get away from legitimizing "war"—on people?)

See Gorbachev's "new way of thinking," mutual security, non-offensive defense...**That was a miracle that did happen, and led to miracle of end of CW, fall of Berlin Wall...a miraculous change in thinking at high levels of a superstate...! (Not just Gorbachev alone; see Institute USA, European peace movement, Freeze...)**

We must shift our individual and group way of thinking: **and acting, resisting, speaking out, whistleblowing, exposing;** and caring, understanding, concern for... (and our "trust" in current leaders!0
(See Arab Spring, Occupy Wall St., Bradley Manning...)

Is there "a way out" that permits:

War, small wars, conventional wars (and preparations for them)? (Rev wars?)

Fossil fuels? Nuclear energy?

Empire? Covert action; debt peonage;

Population growth?

(nation states? Violence? (against women, children...); capitalism? Patriarchy? Maybe! In short or intermediate run, at least: though no need to delay criticism...)

Not without courage, moral courage; risk-taking exploration and speaking out, truth-telling, secret-telling! Organization

MacArthur: the problem of abolishing war is no longer "only" a moral and spiritual problem, one among many ills to be addressed, accepted as probably infeasible: but an urgent necessity (in the nuclear era: like radically reducing use of coal and oil!) (nucs are a short-run problem; but so is latter, as of now!)

My hyp: MH emphasis in 1985 on "inevitability, certainty" was misplaced; nuclear winter **then** was not accepted enough; focus on ending "war"? (and CW was actually about to end!); but a probability far from zero, of vastly more destruction than many WWIIs (he didn't address at all "why" this apparatus had been constructed or accepted, or interests that kept threats going...) Still doesn't...